Australian General election 2016: the (non) result

The most incredible thing about result from Saturday’s poll is not that it ended up so close, but that so many people have been surprised by it. News outlets everywhere are calling it a “shock result”. This is in spite of opinion polls, for weeks, telling us that it would basically be a 50-50 two party preferred split between Labor and Liberal-Nationals, and a high rate of undecided/not sure responses suggested that there would be a big vote for third parties. This is exactly what happened. We are still waiting on a clear result from almost a dozen close seats, and part of the reason why the counting is so uncertain is the jump in primary votes going, collectively, to independents, Nick Xenophon Team, One Nation, the Greens, and a handful of other bit parties (Family First, Australian Christians, Rise Up, etc.)

Turnbull

In the Liberal Party, the recriminations have already begun. It is remarkable that so many in their ranks were surprised by the result, chief among them the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. His election night speech revealed a man who was so confident of a victory, in spite of the abovementioned polls, that he didn’t seem to know how to react. His speech was undignified, defensive, rash. It was that of a sore loser. He could not accept the result. He vented. He defended himself against the inevitable criticisms of the media and backlash within his party. He accused Labor of underhanded tactics (yes, they were underhanded). And, ultimately, he did himself a disservice, looking like a loser even with a close victory still appearing likely.

Turnbull was desperate for the win because he wanted a clear mandate as Prime Minister in his own right. He wanted to be able to say that he had been elected by the people, not simply installed by his party. He desperately wanted Australians to elect him, not just his party. He ran the campaign on the agenda of the Abbott Government, hoping that voters would understand that a clear win would give him the ability to move the party towards his own agenda after he won. Ironically, this strategy was remarkably similar to Abbott’s in 2013, in which he said one thing, knowing that voters really expected him to do otherwise after the election. Exhibit A: paying lip service to a belief in climate science, but, with a nudge and a wink, letting conservative voters know all too clearly that he actually thought climate science was “crap”. When Abbott’s true agenda emerged after the election (in the form of the unpopular 2014 budget), voters turned on him and his government. It simply doesn’t work that way. If you want a mandate, you need to take your agenda to the election, not impose it after you’ve won.

And so, Turnbull made the election all about him. He basically sidelined Treasurer Scott Morrison in the preparation of the 2016 budget that preceded the campaign. He plastered his name over the campaign materials. He managed to keep a lid on the conservative factions in the party (Bernadi, Abetz, Dutton, Andrews, etc.) throughout the campaign. And, on top of all of this, Abbott respectfully faded into the background. There was no Rudd 2010 style white-anting, no sniping. He simply knuckled down and campaigned in his electorate of Warringah.

In making the election all about him, Turnbull has laid the blame for the poor result solely at his own feet. He did not secure the mandate he sought. Rather than giving him the authority to push forward his own agenda, it will invigorate the conservatives of the party. The liberal resurgence has been stymied before it even gathered pace. The socially conservative bloc that has never accepted Abbott’s replacement will continue its stranglehold over the party. Our environment will suffer under half-hearted climate change mitigation. Equal rights will suffer under old-school, conservative positions on matters like same sex marriage and the role of women in society. The poor will be disadvantaged under brutal policies like making unemployed young people wait four weeks for income support. The rampant ideological march of the conservative right will continue, and it is to Australia’s detriment. Those celebrating the now pronounced divisions in the Coalition should stop and reflect on this.

It is amazing how quickly and how powerfully the disunity in the Liberal Party has now emerged, especially given that the Coalition could still yet win the election in the usual sense (forming a majority in the lower house). Conservative cheerleaders are outright calling for Turnbull to resign or be replaced. Liberal politicians (look at you, Cory Bernardi) are making very, very thinly veiled comments about Turnbull’s tenuous hold on the leadership. Others are actually crowing about the poor result, as if they are even pleased that they fared so badly under a leader they dislike.

Compare this with Labor, the party that probably, arguably lost the election. They are united. There is speculation in the media about an Albanese challenge, but there are no serious leftist commentators calling for it, and there have been no suggestions whatsoever from any Labor politicians that it should occur.

Minority government and instability

It is accepted wisdom that the years of the Gillard minority Labor Government were chaotic, unworkable. This is completely false, as evidenced by the significant reform agenda that the government was able to pursue, with the introduction of Gonski, the NDIS, the mining tax, and the carbon emissions pricing scheme. Love or hate each of these initiatives, the fact is that they are significant reforms that one would expect would be difficult to pursue through a parliament where the government didn’t command a majority in either house.

Another basic measure of a parliament’s productivity is the number of Bills introduced and passed. It is a simplistic metric, but it does tell us something of how successful a government has been in pursuing its agenda. In the 43rd Parliament, in which Gillard ran a minority government, there were 683 Bills introduced (579 by government, 72 by private members, and 32 in the Senate), and 595 Bills were passed (this equates to a 87 per cent success rate). In the 44th Parliament, in which Abbott/Turnbull held a majority in the House of Representatives (but not in the Senate), less Bills were introduced (547), with roughly the same proportion passing (475 Bills, 87 per cent).

The fact is: there is no reason why a minority government has to be unworkable. We expect our elected officials to have good communication, consultation and negotiation skills. We rely on them to work together, despite differences, to promote the common good. The Gillard years were evidence that a minority government can pursue its agenda. Indeed, the additional scrutiny applied to policy development, by virtue of the tightly contested votes, can promote better outcomes. Having to negotiate and compromise can lead to policies that better reflect the will of the people, that have a strong evidence base. Compare this situation to the last time a government had a majority in both houses. The then Howard Government rushed its Work Choices legislation through both houses with minimal public debate and little scrutiny, and they found themselves promptly turned out of office.

If Turnbull is able to form a majority government, or negotiate majority confidence with the support of members outside of his party, then there is no reason why he couldn’t lead a productive government. The only things that would prevent him from running a competent government and delivering important reforms would be disunity within his own party and an inability to negotiate legislation through the Senate.

The Senate

In the last Parliament, the Turnbull Government pushed through Senate voting reforms designed to weaken micro parties. Turnbull subsequently used the Senate’s refusal to pass the ABCC Bill as a trigger to request the Governor dissolve both houses for a full election. The voting reforms in concert with a double dissolution election were designed to clean out the Senate. It was felt that the loose cannons of the upper house (Lambie, Leyonhjelm, Muir et al) were standing in the way of the government’s plans (especially the so called “zombie measures” of the 2014 budget), and that a double dissolution would see them replaced by mainstream, major party Senators through the new voting arrangements.

Of all the many failures in this election, this must surely be the greatest. The plan backfired spectacularly.

It looks like there will be no majority in the Senate. The Greens’ representation will probably continue as is. As of today, One Nation looks set to pick up two Senate seats in Queensland, and possibly one in New South Wales.

Ironically, it looks like the ABCC Bill for which the double dissolution election was called now has no chance of being passed by a joint sitting.

Labor

The Labor Party must be thrilled with the result, although there is no doubt that many in the party were genuinely hoping for voters to turn out a first-term government (a la the Newman Government in Queensland). That seemed a distinct possibility with Abbott as leader, which, obviously, is why Turnbull was able to convince a majority of his colleagues to replace him.

Yet it is still a remarkable result for Labor. Shorten has managed to unite the party after years of bitter leadership tussles and factional in-fighting, partly thanks to new leadership voting rules introduced by Rudd in his short second stint as leader. He also did what oppositions don’t typically do – put forward a comprehensive policy agenda well in advance of the election. Labor led the policy debate, leading the Coalition to either adopt or attack Labor’s policies. Labor dictated the terms of the debate, sticking to its strong suits in jobs, health, education and social and economic equality (i.e. penalty rates, marriage equality and housing affordability). The Coalition was left campaigning almost as an opposition would, which created a very upside-down campaign from beginning to end.

Labor seems unlikely to be able to form a minority government out of the ashes of the election, but it has triumphed in a number of important ways. It has rebuilt its image as a strong alternative government, out of the wreckage of its 2009-2013 self-implosion. It has hit a chord with voters on a few touchstone issues, particularly marriage equality and housing affordability. At the same time, it has dealt a blow to a young government, which will leave long-lasting scars. The Coalition is in tatters, with its factions and personalities publicly brawling. The Coalition ran a disciplined campaign; they stuck together, but now, without the motivation of a looming election, the tensions and conflicts have been unleashed. The disunity will ruin them if they aren’t able to rein it in quickly.

The two most disappointing aspects of Labor’s campaign were Mediscare and a poorly explained fiscal strategy.

The Mediscare campaign was complete farce, continuing the trend in Australian politics of running completely roughshod over facts. Perhaps the Liberals have form on weakening Labor institutions like Medicare, and have done themselves a disservice with health policy over the past three years, but the campaign went well and truly beyond the believable. Not only that, but there was the incredibly underhanded tactic of (allegedly) sending voters text messages from “Medicare” in support of Labor on the eve of the election.

Most disappointing was the poor communication over Labor’s fiscal strategy. Chris Bowen is an intelligent, competent alternative Treasurer. He would do a great job in the office, given the chance. But he struggles to get out simple, digestible messages. The fiscal strategy was a prime example. In Labor’s attempts to downplay the differences between their plan and the Coalition’s, they failed to explain the point of their “lesser fiscal contraction” (translation: bigger deficits).

Labor should have explained that the Coalition have no feasible plan to bring the budget back to surplus, that the figures released in the 2016 Budget are based on unrealistic projections of future spending (cuts) and extremely optimistic assumptions about economic growth. They should have put the case that their proposed extra spending over the forward estimates was necessary to achieve a surplus in the medium-term. Their spending would eventually bring a surplus, whereas the Coalition would struggle to ever reach it. This should have been the message. Instead, the Coalition was able to run the usual line about bigger debt and deficit under the economic mismanagement of Labor.

Labor also failed to explain the falsity of the Coalition's budget numbers, given their reliance on the so-called "zombie" measures. The general confusion in the electorate about what these zombies actually comprise needed to be addressed. A range of measures that will never, ever pass through both houses, like making unemployed people wait four weeks for income support, continue to be factored into the Coalition's numbers. The promised return to surplus then, is false. This was never clearly explained to Australians, who still cling to the notion that the Liberal party is the superior economic and fiscal manager.

The upshot

All in all, this was a far more interesting election than many gave it credit.

A couple of days in and we still don't have an outcome.

However, there remain many serious policy debates that need to be had. Both major parties failed to put forward credible options for structural budget repair, for a credible economic plan, for meaningful tax reform, for real education policy, for sensible asylum policy. These are all areas on which Australia needs real, immediate action.